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ABSTRACT

This study outlines the changes which occur in Swiss cantonal
budgets between 1967 and 1977. These changes are computed as an
index of demonstrated budgetary flexibility, DBF, representing
this investigation’s dependent variable.
Five explanatory variables,
drawn from previous studies of Japanese prefectures and West German
municipalities, are tested against the dependent variable.
The
explanatory variables are environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy,
environmental dynamism, interparty competition and local resource
availability. A sixth variable, direct democracy, was also tested
because three of twenty-five cantons are governed by direct democracy.
This analysis found that population size as a measure of
environmental complexity, represents the most powerful explanatory
variable defining variations in demonstrated budgetary flexibility.
Fiscal autonomy and interparty competition are the second and third
most relevant explanatory variables.
The behavior of Swiss cantons more closely approximates
Japanese prefectures than West German municipalities.
Both
Switzerland and Japan have concepts of ’’consensus” which affect the
decisionmaking process.
The Japanese call their "consensus"
baransu, and the Swiss label theirs, consociationality. Since it
appears that baransu influenced decisionmakers in Japan, this Swiss
analysis focuses on the definition and relevance of consociationalism
to interparty competition.
Further, the three cantons with direct
democracy were tested against DBF and found to be statistically
reliable.
This study concludes that incrementalist assumptions are
more applicable to some Swiss cantons' behavior than others.
Budgetary stability is determined by a combination of environmental
complexity, fiscal autonomy and politics.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

Budgets are a reflection of a government's response to the
questions of political economy:
what purposes.

who gets what, from whom and for

In answering these questions economic theory requires

governments to set budget priorities rationally.

Democratic economic

theory further requires that the priorities reflect citizens' needs.
However, incremental theory suggests that budgetary priorities are
rather inflexible over time.

This inflexibility appears as an

unchanging budget or produces inflexible budgetary priorities.
Three explanations exist for such stability.
First, the budget could mirror the fact that a government is
totally responsive to citizens’ changing needs which remain largely
unchanged from year to year.

Second, the government could be unre

sponsive to citizens' changing needs, therefore making stability in
the budget a reflection of a government's disregard for these needs.
Third,

it might be that the government's budgetary responses are

restricted to reallocation within departments.

Resource scarcity

limits both the allocation and reallocation of funds.
If either of the last two conclusions is applicable, then the
transfer of funds in response to changing social needs is impeded.
Unwanted or unnecessary programs will continue while new or urgently

1

needed programs go uninitiated.

The budget stability represented in

these situations is counterproductive.

It could signify the

economically inefficient and politically undemocratic use of scarce
resources.

Therefore, the controversy over whether budget priorities

are set incrementally or not is a relevant question to anyone affected
by budget allocations.
Most political scientists accept the view that incrementalism
generally characterizes a government's formulation of its policies.^
Recently, however, two studies conducted on West German municipalities
and Japanese prefectures have questioned this concept.

My study of

Switzerland and its budget is patterned after these two analyses.
Two issues, first addressed in the study of West German
municipalities
implications.

2

arise when discussing budgetary flexibility and its

First, how much do budget shares vary over time?

what factors affect the amount of budgetary variation?

Second,

Both of these

queries, answered in long and short-run analysis, represent the crux
of the thesis.
In essence, this thesis has two purposes:

to define DBF and

the variables which determine its variation and to analyze under what
settings the variables affect DBF.

The second goal is achieved by

presenting four regression models, each composed of three or four
of the five explanatory variables identified in the West German and
Japanese studies.

The conclusion includes a broad comparison between

the demonstrated budgetary flexibility of the three studies.
Five factors were found to influence DBF and will be used as

2

explanatory variables for the Swiss study:

environmental complexity,

fiscal autonomy, local resource availability, interparty competition/
direct democracy and environmental dynamism.

Each is thoroughly

explained in Chapter III, Research Methods.
Four hypotheses are presented for testing:

1) as environ

mental complexity increases, demonstrated budgetary flexibility
decreases; 2) as fiscal autonomy increases, DBF decreases; 3) as
interparty competition increases, DBF decreases; and 4) as direct
democracy exists, demonstrated budgetary flexibility increases.

The

four regression models in Chapter IV explain the conclusions of the
hypotheses.
In conjunction with the questions on DBF and the factors
influencing its variation, the issue of Swiss politics is raised.
Switzerland is a confederation with both direct democracy and
representative democracy.

The question to be answered is does the

type of democracy affect demonstrated budgetary flexibility?
how much and why?

If so,

The regression models in Chapter IV address these

issues.
The continuing debate over whether Switzerland is a consociational democracy or not is the final characteristic discussed in this
thesis.

Because the concept of baransu or "evenhandedness11 influenced

the results of the Japanese study, I felt the question of consociationality might have the same effect.

3

A review of the litera

ture on consociationality is found in Chapter II and sets up a frame
work for answering the question of whether the type of democracy

3

affects DBF.

It is interesting to note that the literature indicates

that the question of whether Switzerland is a consociational democracy
or not is unresolved.

To me, the fascination of consociationalism

springs from whether, within representative democracy, cantons'
consociationalism makes a difference.

The analysis in Chapter IV

dealing with the interparty competition variable answers this question.
This analysis is organized into four chapters.

Chapter II

is a review of the literature concerning incrementalism and consociationality.

It also includes a summary of the results of the

Japanese prefectural study.

Chapter III outlines and explains my

research methodology and problems encountered with the data.
Chapter IV presents the explanation and analysis of my four regression
models.

Chapter V contains the study's conclusions and directions

for future research.

4

CHAPTER II
REVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS OF INCREMENTAL THEORY,
JAPANESE DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY
AND CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

This chapter is divided into three sections, each reviewing
relevant aspects of the literature on incrementalism, Japanese
prefectural budgeting, and consociationalism.

This review places

Swiss budgetary flexibility within a proper framework.

A more

detailed comparison of Japanese and Swiss DBF appears in Chapter
IV.
I
Incremental decisionmaking holds that major budgetary decisions
are made within the executive branch, because the legislature does
not have the time to make them.

These decisionmakers are not elected

and therefore are not as sensitive to public pressures as elected
legislators.

Regardless of legislators' beholdenness to the public,

however, they rarely change an executive recommendation, partly
because of the complexity of the budget and partly because of the
balanced budget requirement for subnational governments.
item increases, another must decrease.

As one line

This balancing act requires

time and expertise.
Legislators do not have the time to make substantial recom
mendations for budgetary changes.

They lack financial expertise and

5

have inadequate staff support, placing them in the awkward position
of having to accept the executive's budget or research alternatives
on their own time and at their own expense.

The task of legislators

then is confined to checking for outright mistakes or explaining why
funding is unavailable.

Consequently, the executive's budget is

often left unchanged.
Since the executive branch is assigned the task of preparing
the budget, several sets of "simple allocation rules" facilitate the
process.

For example, an executive administrator looks to historical

precedent in determining feasible expenditures for the upcoming
budget.

Charles Lindblom states:
An administrator would rely heavily on the record of
past experiences with small policy steps to predict
the consequences of similar steps extended into the
future.^John Crecine, in his book, Governmental Problem Solving:

A

Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting, further supports the
contention that executive branch administrators must rely on past
histories and fragmented methods of analysis.^

Most budget requests

or problems are too complex to be dealt with on a holistic level.
Therefore, they are treated like lines in a telephone directory;
each is examined one at a time.

Defining subareas of budget requests

facilitates information gathering and priority-setting.
Unlike the legislators, the executive administrators have
knowledge, albeit limited, and staff expertise at their disposal.
They make policy choices rationally by applying marginal adjustments

6

to past successful policies to formulate current budgetary policies.
Choices based on these criteria (marginal adjustments) yield apparently
stable budgets because the most reliance is placed on the preceding
year's agreed upon budget.

In some respects, by eliminating policy

choices, incremental budgeting alleviates pressure and focuses
attention on an increase for all.

Thus, if increases are made on

a fixed-percentage, across-the-board basis, each unit from year to
year maintains its share of the budget pie.
An incremental model is simply defined as follows.

The hth

government's chief finance officer takes as his initial expenditure
estimate for the ith administrative unit, for the total budget
resources, j, in year, k, the amount authorized for expenditure in
year, k-1.

J

This is, EXP, . .. ,
9
hijk-1

^

EXP, . .. .
hxjk

Then each item is increased on a fixed-percentage, acrossthe-board basis.

This is a special kind of incremental model, one

in which shares remain absolutely stable.

The procedure "satisfies"

the administrative u n i t ’s spending demand by providing each with a
"fair share" of the revenue increment (REV,., - REV,
.).
hjk
hjk-1

An

allocation of this type insures that each unit maintains its relative
share of the budgetary pie.
To determine the budget in year, k, it is logical to examine
expenditures in year, k-1.

A budget was agreed upon in year, k-1,

and therefore forms the best model for year, k's, budget.

An across-

the-board increase alleviates political pressures, especially those
worked out and reflected in year, k-l's, budget.

Incremental theory

suggests that this reliance on "fair shares" and historical precedent
leads to the conclusion that budget shares do not change at all or
not much from year to year.

Aaron Wildavsky best sums up this idea:

Budgeting is incremental . . .
A budget is almost never
actively reviewed as a whole a year after . . . Instead
it is based on last year's budget with special attention
given to a narrow range of increases and decreases . . .
Thus . . . those who make the budget are concerned with
relatively small increments to an existing b a s e . 6
This model of budgeting as incremental is widely believed as
valid and supported by John Crecine and Aaron Wildavsky.^

Accepting

this notion requires acceptance of public policy as also organized
incrementally, especially as the budget is a plan for public policy.
William L. Morrow points out that this idea is a logical continuation
of the preceding statement in light of the fact that the bureaucracy
which produces the public policy has "sunk so much into existing
programs that to start from scratch is too disruptive, wasteful

g
and impractical."

Thus the executive branch and the bureaucracy

contribute to incrementalism being used as the appropriate budgetary
decisionmaking procedure.

By using incrementalism, budget stability

is maintained.
Several criticisms have been levied against budgetary
incrementalism.

Wildavsky states that incrementalism produces clear-

cut conclusions about budgetary priorities,
Irving Bupp question this point.

9

but P. B. Natchez and

Both find budgeting to be an

incremental process, however the unit of application is at fault.
That is, most budget analysts concentrate their efforts on depart
ments as administrative units of analysis.
8

This focus obscures the

TABLE 1
SIMPLE, STABLE-SHARE, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL
MEASURING DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY

1.

ihuk

E&P, ...

hijk-L

2.

EXP, ...
| hi2 k

3.

E'Sp, . ., = REV, .
hijk
hjk

<-

EXP, ... + a, . . (REV ..
hijk
hij
hjk

yes
A

4.

BShijk -

5.

BS, ... — BS, ...
hijk
hijk

I

(BXphijk

f

A

The source for this model was extracted from Robert Rickards’
doctoral dissertation, p. 83.

9

process itself which has produced the public policy--i.e ., the budget.
According to Natchez and Bupp, there must be a shift in emphasis
from departments to p r o g r a m s . ^
weighing policy alternatives.

Efforts would be directed then toward
Incrementalism’s effectiveness as a

tool used to explain how conflicts are avoided would be hampered by
this change.
My study of Switzerland focuses on the departments within
cantons and is subject, therefore, to the Natchez and Bupp criticism.
However, I do not think that this weakness has adversely affected
my investigation.

My examination covers allocation across and within

cantons focusing on money given to and generated by cantons.

But

priority-setting goes on at departmental level when the comptroller
considers the entire budget.

Therefore, the same analysis conducted

in smaller political units is conducted here too.

The emphasis on

programs rather than departments is unnecessary since both are
included in the departmental analysis.
In conclusion, incremental explanations have been used to
account for budgetary behavior observed by budgetary analysts.

The

incremental models are simple to use and popular in a number of
studies concerning budgeting in international organizations,1*' U.S.
cities,

12

and local school systems.

13

They are further used to

evaluate government programs such as revenue sharing.
rely on two tools:

The models

historical precedent and fragmentation.

14

The

questions raised in this study include whether or not these tools are
used in Swiss cantonal budgeting procedures.

10

My research concentrates

on whether adjustments in budget shares

occur on a fixed-across-

the-board basis or not.
II
A number of time-series studies have discovered unstable
expenditure

patterns for certain programs within certain agencies.

16

The instability of the expenditures forces a questioning of the
blanket application of incrementalism as characterizing budgetary
patterns.

Two studies conducted within the past ten years further

erode the assumption that incremental theory is universally appli
cable .^
A 1980 investigation of West German budget priorities defined
the differing extent to which incremental models are applicable
even at the departmental level of analysis.

The units of analysis

were West German municipalities and the study concluded that "consi
derable flexibility in setting spending priorities for departments
exists within single governments over time and across governments at
a point in time."

18

The above-mentioned variables are used to

explain when or under what conditions the greatest deviations from
an existing budget are likely to occur.

Given these findings, then,

it is important to test and retest the variables and note if they
constitute an adequate explanation for budgetary behavior in other
national, governmental, temporal contexts.
In 1982, a study of Japanese prefectural budgeting, patterned
after the West German analysis, provided similar, though not as
conclusive results.

The Japanese study revealed that budgetary

11

flexibility is more likely to occur under the same circumstances,
drawing this same conclusion as the West

German study.

As one of my

hypotheses, I suggest that Swiss cantonal and Japanese prefectural
behavior will be comparable.

Therefore, a detailed recapitulation

of the Japanese analysis follows in order to clarify the connection
between the two.
Japanese budgeting is characterized by the concept, baransu,
or "balance."

Baransu is closely akin to the American notion of

"fair-share" budgeting as Aaron Wildavsky defines it:

"A convergence

of expectations on roughly how much an administrative unit is to
receive in comparison to others."

19

"Fair-share" budgeting is the

ideal type of decisionmaking strategy because, as noted in section one
of this chapter, the "fair-share" revenue increment allocated each
department is just sufficient for the unit to maintain its slice
of the budget pie.

Therefore, baransu when defined as comparable

to "fair-share" budgeting, should also be the ideal decisionmaking
strategy for Japanese budgeting.

Strict adherence to the baransu

concept should produce "budgetary priorities that are absolutely
inflexible over time."

20

This does approximate real world behavior,

even though the Japanese seem predisposed to reach decisions on the
basis of consensus.
The Japanese analysis revealed that budgets change, but not
much over time and between prefectures.
to affect budget stability:

Three factors were found

local resource availability, environmen-

tal complexity and interparty competition.

12

21

Baransu is understood

as a concept covered under how to deal with the complexity of the
prefecture.

Chie Nakane speaks of "democracy" in Japan to mean that:

Any decision should be made on the basis of a consensus
which includes those located lower in the hierarchy
. . . it should leave no one frustrated or dis
satisfied .22
This conceptual framework is related to consociationality, which
has been noted in Switzerland.

23

Upon this similarity--consensus--

I will build a comparison between Japanese and Swiss budget-share
priorities.

Baransu and Nakane's definition of "democracy" approxi

mate a consociational situation with regard to making policies.

For

example, major parties in both Japan and Switzerland are represented
at the national level.

Albeit, the Japanese have one dominant

party, the Swiss have five major parties and all are represented.
But the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan has many factions,
while the major Swiss parties comprise a power-sharing bloc.

The

bloc acts like one large party with factions, i.e., like the LDP.
In Japan, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) dominates the
budgetary process.

It has the expertise, manpower and time necessary

to produce public policy.

The Liberal Democratic Party penetrates

the budgetary process through the Ministry of Finance; therefore,
the MOF takes the LDP's role in fiscal decisionmaking seriously.
The party, alone, however, is insufficiently equipped to evaluate
competing spending proposals.

The budgetary process, then, is more

or less controlled by the executive branch.

And as with incremental

theory, the Japanese MOF "satisfies" all units by granting each

13

administrative unit funding equal to its base year appropriation plus
an increase in spending authority approximating the overall budget's
growth rate.

24

This method of fund distribution minimizes conflicts

among factions of the LDP and produces a budget which is more
readily acceptable to most units.
The conclusion then is that Japanese budget-setting priorities
are incremental.

The incremental model generally explains priority-

setting at the departmental level quite well.

However, there still

is interprefectural variation in the model's utility.

And in

comparative analysis, West German municipalities exercised greater
demonstrated budgetary flexibility than Japanese prefectures.

One

explanation of this behavior was the absence of the baransu concept
in West Germany.
However, budget shares in Japanese prefectures were not
always stable.

And in those prefectures which indicated greater

flexibility, certain qualities were present.

Three variables

accounted for DBF in both West Germany and Japan and each is explained
below.
Local resource availability, indicated by taxes, was the most
powerful explanatory variable.
and West Germany.

It accounted for DBF both in Japan

For those prefectures which have few uncommitted

resources, there is less inclination to alter the budget because
there are no funds with which to undertake new programs.
the budget priorities remain unchanged.

25

Therefore,

Those prefectures with

greater revenue generating capabilities are better able to cover

14

existing expenditures, and meet new demands, which are more likely
to involve reallocation than is merely continuing present programs.
Prefectures with higher levels of local resource availability demon
strate a higher amount of budgetary flexibility.
The second most potent explanatory variable was environmental
complexity, defined as the number of problems with which budgetary
officials are faced.
Japanese study.
to be served.

Population size was the indicator in the

The more populous the prefecture, the more clients
The more clients, the greater the variety of demands

for goods and services.

More demands required more agencies, depart

ments, and programs to fulfill the citizens' needs.

To meet the

demands, each unit must compete for local or natural resources.
Therefore, the more demands officials have to deal with, the greater
complexity of the environment and thus the heavier the reliance on
stable-share allocation procedures.

There are more competitors for

the same funds in large governments, but the time constraint is
identical for both small and large governments.

Environmental com

plexity was negatively correlated with demonstrated budgetary
flexibility.

As population size increased, DBF decreased.

"Apparently

officials in more complex environments are less inclined to alter
existing interdepartmental expenditure priorities

1^

Interparty competition was the third variable affecting
demonstrated budgetary flexibility.
was weak but significant.

The relationship between the two

As interparty competition increased,

budgetary flexibility decreased.

This finding was consistent with

15

the results of the West German data.

The closer to a one-party,

noncompetitive environment, the more flexible the budget.

Apparently,

political parties in both countries are reluctant to enter into
formal coalitions.

27

In Japan, the prefectures with less interparty

competition tend to demonstrate a greater DBF.
dominates, the more flexible the budget.

The more the LDP

The low interparty

competition in West Germany is due perhaps in part to the fact that
in a noncompetitive environment, one party can muster the majority
needed in order to pass its desired legislation.

Thus it is more

amenable to change.
Several conclusions drawn from the Japanese study should
appear in my Swiss study.

First, both nations have budget processes

affected in some form by the idea of consensus (baransu, con
sociationalism) .

Second, the same three variables--local resources

availability, environmental complexity, interparty competition-should influence DBF.

Third, Swiss budgets should reflect a

stability of the same nature as the Japanese pattern.

I suspect

Swiss contons are more comparable to Japanese prefectures because
the units of analysis are homologous.

Before analyzing the empirical

data, however, it is important to examine some Swiss characteristics
in more detail, especially the concept of consociationalism.
Ill
The third review in this chapter concerns consociationalism.
My purpose is to explain generally the concept and its possible
application to Swiss federalism.

16

Switzerland is a confederation of twenty-five cantons,
twenty-two having representative democracy and three having direct
democracy.

The federal level of government has a Federal Council

which is elected and seated by proportional representation.

The

behavior of elites at the federal level has been studied more
frequently than at the cantonal level.

28

But general conclusions

drawn about behavior at the federal level probably can be applied
to the cantons.

One such conclusion is the existence of con-

sociationalism.
Switzerland is considered to be the best model of politics
of accommodation.

29

where in the nation:

There are potential disruptive divisions every
French-speaking vs. German-speaking peoples;

ethnic Italians vs. ethnic Swiss Germans; Catholics vs. Protestants;
urban vs. rural.

Yet Switzerland functions amazingly well, avoiding

the political upheaval, which usually characterize societies with
strong cultural cleavages.

The question is why is it so stable?

Several answers present themselves.
First, the multitude of tensions actually makes for stability.
There are so many cross-cutting tensions that cantonal alliances
shift.
out.

The tendency is for the tensions or rifts to cancel each other
The character of the Swiss people, themselves, plays a role in

cancelling out these tensions.

There appears to exist a traditional

spirit of accommodation and compromise which has characterized
Swiss politics for centuries.

At the federal level, all Swiss parties

from Communists to Christian Democrats are seated.

17

At the cantonal

level, parties can be elected from any part of the spectrum.

As a

matter of fact, the sheer number and range of parties accepted at
both levels could indicate the high tolerance for diversity the Swiss
have.

Perhaps the Swiss system has succeeded so far because the

people have come to accept variety.

The constant exposure to diverse

elements has tempered the Swiss spirit and focused the citizens'
attention on compromise.

This explanation is no more operationaliz-

able than the elements of consociationalism, but it is useful in
depicting the character of the people the Swiss government serves.
Perhaps, Arend Lijphart's conclusion that Switzerland is consociational
could be partially supported by this idea.
Second, the Swiss tend to render government as impersonal as
possible.

This impersonal attitude lessens tensions produced by

emotions.

Therefore, elite politics reflectsless conflict than mass

politics.

Incrementalism is one way to dampen conflicts among

elites.

30

As the budgetary process relies more heavily on incremental

assumptions, conflict and tension is reduced.

Perhaps the Swiss

system reflects these incremental assumptions.
Debate over the topic has led to several definitions of
consociationalism, cleavages, subcultural segmentation and majority
rule.

31

The major problem lies in the fact that these definitions

are difficult to operationalize.

For example, Arend Lijphart argues

that Switzerland is a consociational democracy based on several
evident societal cleavages:

a) Swiss linguistic diversity;

b) ethnic diversity; c) religious segmentation; and d) class

18

cleavages.

32

Brian Barry, Jurg Steiner, Robert H. Dorff and D. E.

Bohn respond that these cleavages do not really define Switzerland
as a consocietional democracy, because they are cross-cut; that is,
cleavages are not definitively and statistically defined.

Shifting

segmentations place Swiss citizens in several groups at once,
thereby diluting the rigidity of dividing lines.

Because the

rigidity does not exist, the desire for compromise or consensus is
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overrated.

Third, the decisionmaking pattern of Swiss elites helps
explain Switzerland's stability.

The pattern is determined by and

affects the level of tension among the groups.

Jurg Steiner and

Robert H. Dorff note two types of decisionmaking processes:

the

competitive pattern of conflict management, represented by majority
rule; and the noncompetitive, cartelized pluralist pattern, which
functions under the device of amicabilis compositio or amicable
34

agreement.

It is this second decisionmaking process which seems

to apply to Swiss federal and cantonal governments.

The emphasis

on consensus of the group(s) is the same as Japanese baransu,
Nakane's concept of "democracy" and seems to be related to the
"impersonal" character of Swiss government.
Consociationalism has been identified at the federal level,
in both the Federal Council and Council of States.
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For consocia

tionalism to succeed, however, there are four prerequisites which
must be present.

Primarily, the elites must have the ability to

accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures

19

(societal diversions).

Second, the elites, therefore, must have the

ability to transcend the cleavages and to join in a common effort
with the elites of rival subcultures.

This ability depends on the

elites' commitment to the maintenance of the system.

Third, the

elites must strive to improve the cohesion and stability of the
system.

This requires low tension levels.

This could be

accommodated if resource reallocation within the budget had no
political implications, for example.

Fourth, the underlying

assumption accepted by all the elites is that they understand the
dangers and consequences of political fragmentation.

If all four of

these conditions are fulfilled, then a consociational decisionmaking
process exists.

The important question is, if it exists in Switzerland,

then one can expect results similar to the Japanese study.

The

prerequisites for consociationalism in Switzerland appear, supporting
the contention that Swiss DBF and Japanese DBF are influenced by the
notion of consensus.

The results in Chapter IV explain the empirical

evidence confirming these conclusions.
In closing, consociationalism in Switzerland could be related
to the fact that Switzerland is a confederation.

The importance and

relevance of federalism to my study is that the existence of
federalism is usually reflected in finance.

J. Murray Luck best

sums it up:
The test of the reality of a federation is usually in
finance.
In this respect, Swiss federalism is quite
real. . . The cantons >. . . have substantial financial
resources of their own. . . (They) resort to income tax,
wealth tax, fees, loans, etc.
There is no federal ceiling
on the amounts or sources of cantonal income.^6
20

In light of this cantonal autonomy, the fact that the confederation
of Switzerland functions smoothly lends credence to the argument
that consensus and common will
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govern the Swiss political system.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The most difficult part of the thesis involved the organiza
tion of the data.

The research design presents the questions out

lined in the introduction:

how much do budget shares vary over time,

across cantons and what factors affect demonstrated budgetary
flexibility?
formulated.
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In answering these questions, four hypotheses were
The hypotheses were tested with data drawn from the

Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz for years 1967 to 1977.
Information on cantonal population size, cantonal taxes and tax
rates, interparty competition and general wealth was recorded and
explanatory variables were singled out for use in regression models.
The years 1967 to 1977 were chosen because of consistency in
departmental categories.

Some departments were deleted or added to

others, but manipulation of the data successfully reduced the number
of budget divisions to a common basis of fourteen categories.
Discussion of this weakness follows later in this chapter.
A second reason for choosing these years and Swiss cantons
as units of analysis is the diversity reflected in the budget over
this period of time.
for all cantons.

Tables 2 and 3 represent the budget categories

The figures approximately equal the total general

budget expenditure.
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As is seen in the charts, there is much

22

TABLE 2
DIVERSITY IN SWISS BUDGET SHARES ACROSS
CANTONS FOR YEARS, 1967-1977

Category

Maximum.

Minimum

Mean

S .D .

General Administration

8.58

3.02

5.49

1.48

Justice/Law

8.58

2.64

6.12

1.64

Military Affairs/
Defense

5.66

1.25

3.12

1.45

33.29

6.91

20.28

7.66

.40

.57

12.28

7.34

.223

.57

Education
Religion
Public Health
Land Management

1.73
26.71
1.22

0
1.05
.001

Roads and Construction

71.12

6.15

23.08

14.51

Social Planning

11.47

1.91

7.15

3.45

.006

1.02

1.15

Traffic/Energy

3.98

Social Affairs

25.09

.29

8.50

6.19

Environmental and
Social Welfare

6.38

1.31

3.37

1.80

Financial Expense

18.32

.76

3.24

3.58

1.90

4.08

1.41

Budget Interest

6.335

-25 cases in the long-run analysis:

25 cantons.

-Represents total budget.
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TABLE 3
DIVERSITY IN SWISS BUDGET SHARES ACROSS
CANTONS FOR YEARS, 1967-1977

Category_________________ Maximum____ Minimum______ Mean_______ S .D .
General Administration

9.9

2.0

5.28

1.48

Justice/Law

11.7

.6

6.13

1.64

Military Affairs/
Defense

12.1

.8

3.12

1.45

Education

37.0

4.3

20.28

7.66

.40

.57

12.22

7.34

.22

.57

Religion
Public Health
Land Management

2.2
36.8
8.0

Roads and Construction

76.0

Social Planning

18.1

Traf f ic/Energy

5.6

Social Affairs

35.5

Environmental and
Social Welfare

13.9

Financial Expense

22.2

Budget Interest

0

8.4

.3
0
3.5
.19
0
.1

0
.38
1.3

-275 observations for short-run analysis:
years = 25 x 11 = 275.
-Represents total budget.
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23.07

14.5

7.15

4.37

1.02

1.15

8.50

6.19

3.37

2.47

3.25

3.58

4.08

1.41

25 cantons over 11

diversity in both the short- and long-run analysis.
Switzerland as a case study was chosen because of a personal
interest in the country, its laws, politics and behavior.

Further,

similarities and differences from the two preceding studies of West
Germany and Japan make their comparison interesting.

Switzerland

is a small, natural resource poor, but extremely affluent, heterogeneous country.
divisions,
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There are three ethnic groups,

and several political parties.

42

40

four linguistic

Four official languages

exist, although German is by far the most widely spoken.
The political system is fragmented in that there are a
myriad of political parties, each entitled to representation.
Elections are held either every four, five, or six years, and
officials are seated by proportional representation.
Heterogeneity, geography and politics differentiate
Switzerland from Japan and West Germany.

The concept of baransu

in Japan resembles the idea of consociationality in Switzerland.
In both, consensus is the key to the government's smooth functioning.
Second, both cantons and prefectures are comparable units of
analysis in size and administrative organization.

Switzerland is

a "loose" federal grouping of cantons--i.e ., a confederation. Japan
is more tightly centralized and is not a federal system.

However,

the method of decisionmaking, similar in both units, compensates
for the difference in national governments.

The West German system

is federal, but the municipalities reflect more DBF than either
Japanese prefectures or Swiss cantons.
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Further, the size and

organization of municipal governments are different in Germany.
It is more decentralized than the other two.
Japan has one large party, the Liberal Democratic Party,
which controls both the national and prefectural levels of govern
ment, making minority party representation and impact difficult.
The Swiss political system does not have one large party, but
rather parties acting in consensus as a "bloc" and operating as a
large party.

The "bloc" is a manifestation of consociationality

at work in Switzerland.

Because the bloc operates as one large

party with factions, budget-setting priorities should be determined
as they are in Japan.

That is, the LDP in Japan has great impact on

the budgetary process by working through the government, which
operates under baransu.

Therefore, each department is granted an

increment over last year's budget, thereby"satisficing" each unit.
The factions within the LDP are tempered by the fact that all areas
seem to receive "equal" treatment in budget allocation.

Swiss

behavior should approximate Japanese results.
The closer the bloc is in consensus, the more it resembles
movement toward a one party system.

The closer to a one party

system, the more flexible the budget.
budget behavior should be similar.

Thus Japanese and Swiss

If the results are the same,

then consocietionalism, like baransu, has an effect on DBF.
Interest in Switzerland led me to pose some of the above
listed questions.

Before defining the explanatory variables used

to answer these questions, an explanation of demonstrated budgetary
flexibility is required.
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Demonstrated budgetary flexibility is a concept describing
deviations from routine budgetary decisionmaking.

This indicator

determines budget fluctuations from year to year and between
cantons.

In order to calculate DBF, the budget is divided into

categories which are consistent over a period of time.

These

categories reflect administrative structure of cantonal governments.
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In several instances the categories equal combinations of

smaller categories reduced to one division.

The problems and effects

this had will be discussed later in this chapter.
The steps to determine DBF are:
1.

divide each share of the budget within each category by

the total budget which equals the percentage of the total budget this
share i s ;
2.

subtract the base year category from previous year's

category;
3.

take the absolute value of the figure in step 2 in order

to prevent double counting increases and decreases;
4.

sum the absolute value differences (from step 3) = DBF.

Table 4 illustrates this procedure.
In the Swiss case, there are a total of 275 observations of
budget shares, but 250 observations for budget differences because
no differences are computed for beginning year, 1967.

The DBF,

then, is calculated to define the budget-setting priorities over
time and at a point in time.
Regressions and correlation analyses were performed for
comparative purposes, keeping in mind the impact of a slightly less
27

TABLE 4
SIMPLE, STABLE-SHARE, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL
MEASURING DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY

1.

EXP

2.

EXP,...
I hijk

3.

5§P . .

E&>

^

hij k-L

hijk

<-

..

hij k

Exphijk + ahij (REVhjk

REVhjk-L)

= REV, .
hjk
yes

4.

5.

>AY
BShijk ■ (EXPhijk /

I

A

BS, .
- BS, .
hijk
hijk

The source for this model was extracted from Robert Rickards’
doctoral dissertation, p. 83.
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than sufficient, n, in the long-run analysis.

The impact of this

inherent weakness is dealt with later in this chapter.
An indicator is available now to answer the questions of
political economy.

-The next step is to determine what factors

affect the flexibility of the budget as represented by DBF.
past studies,
stability:

44

In

five factors were found to explain budgetary

fiscal autonomy, environmental complexity, environ

mental dynamism, interparty competition, and local resource avail
ability.

These variables are used in my study to confirm and expand

previous findings.
Each investigation of DBF has measured explanatory variables
a bit differently.

The Swiss variables were drawn from the

Statistiches Jahrbuch der Schweiz and are defined below.
Fiscal autonomy represents the independence a canton
exercises from federal funds.

Theoretically, the more autonomous

a canton--i.e ., the more independent of federal funds--the easier
it is to shift budget priorities.

Less funds are allocated to

predetermined programs or departments.

The cantons which generate

the most local resources usually exercise the greatest autonomy
because they rely less on federal monies for total budget opera
tions .
In Switzerland, the federal government awards sums of money
to each canton.

The figure varies from .6 percent to 64 percent of

the total receipts.

The amount of money the canton receives, whether

it is rich or poor, determines how funds are reallocated, whether
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new programs are feasible or whether the budget remains unchanged.
This variable was computed two different ways because the level of
federal contributions
years.

was

only available for two of my eleven

Therefore, the variables calculating autonomy equalled the

actual federal contribution and the ratio of federal to cantonal
contribution.

The ratio of contributions was chosen as the indicator

of fiscal autonomy.

This measure was picked both for its consistency

and its lack of multi-colinearity problem.

In all four regression

models presented in Chapter IV, fiscal autonomy remained statistically
significant and a useful explanatory of variation in demonstrated
budgetary flexibility.
Environmental complexity is defined as the number of problems
which a budgetary official must face.
population size.

One possible measure is

Or, as in the Japanese study, the number of civil

servants and budget size were used as the indicators.

In

Switzerland as in West Germany, the natural log of population
represented the environmental complexity.

When DBF was plotted

against population a curvilinear relationship was found.

In order

to describe this relationship a natural log transformation of these
data has been carried out.
Environmental dynamism is the third variable presented as a
possible explanation of DBF variation.

For Switzerland, a growth

rate was computed by subtracting from the population in base year
the previous y e a r ’s population.
the base year population.

This number was then divided by

The natural log of this figure was taken
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to make it comparable to the environmental complexity variable.
Interparty competition is determined by a series of equations
developed in the West German and Japanese studies.

Party ,rblocsM

were outlined in Switzerland by reading literature on the topic.
The blocs were summed, divided by the total number of representatives
for each canton, and subtracted from 50 percent.

The absolute

value of this subtraction equals the interparty competition variable.
Five blocs were tested:

a) the Christian Democrats, the

Radicals, the Liberals, the Socialists; b) the Swiss People's Party,
the Christian Democrats, the Radicals and the Socialists; c) the
Christian Democrats, the Radicals, the Liberals, the Swiss People's
Party and the Socialists; d) the Christian Democrats, the Radicals
and the Socialists; and e) the Socialists.

Each party was represented

somewhere in Switzerland, but the problem of direct democracy in
three cantons meant that only twenty-two calculations for interparty
competition could be made.

Therefore, testing hypotheses related

to direct democracy required the use of dummy variables.

This use

avoided confusion over the impact of direct democracy on the inter
party competition variable.

The dummy calculation yielded 275

observations in the short-run as opposed to 220 cases for the inter
party competition short-run.
The final variable used to explain demonstrated budgetary
flexibility is local resource availability or wealth.

Each cantonal

government in Switzerland taxes various items or services within the
canton--i.e., income, wealth, automobiles, inheritance.
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The data

used as a measure of wealth was the deflated per capita tax on income
and inheritance.

This indicator covered as much of the economic

value of the cantons as possible.

If one measures a locality's

stock of wealth and its income stream, its entire economic value
has been assessed.
There were several problems with the data which led to
consequences for the study or produced weaknesses.

Throughout the

period, 1967 to 1977, the most pressing problem was inconsistency
with budget categories.

As pointed out earlier, the divisions

went from eighteen in 1967 to fourteen in 1977, with some fluctua
tions in between.

The categories were grouped together under new

or old titles or else completely deleted, leaving no clue as to how
the budget category funds were accounted for in subsequent budgets.
Manipulations with the data included subtracting out two categories,
and creating a new total.

4*

Nevertheless, some budget categories

remained unchanged and those created by manipulation were meaningful
and reflective of Swiss governmental structure.
In conjunction with the budget category inconsistency, the
scope of the study was limited further by the fact that all data were
drawn from one source, the Statistiches Jahrbuch der Schweiz.

Any

errors in recording, typing or data gathering could not be checked
by me because I only used this source.

However, there were no

missing data and no glaring inconsistency from year to year noted in
any of the information used.

A certain amount of random error is

expected and accounted for in this study.
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The explanatory variables themselves created some difficulties.
Those variables which most influenced demonstrated budgetary flex
ibility in post studies--wealth, environmental complexity, and
interparty competition--were calculated differently.

Different

measures were drawn, identifying the same concepts as in the past.
These measures could affect BS and beta weights.

For example,

fiscal autonomy was calculated on the basis of data available for
only two years,
tions.

1976 and 1977, then modified to fit all 275 observa

The preferred method of calculating fiscal autonomy would be

to subtract the federal contributions to cantons from total cantonal
receipts to determine how much cantonal income is locally generated.
However, the variable fiscal autonomy was highly correlated with the
limited variable of federal contributions indicating that both were
explaining the same thing more or less.
The question of consociationality presented problems because
the concept has never been measured quantitatively.

Several studies

battle over the criteria for determining consociationality, but no
decision is reached on the concept's applicability to Switzerland.
The common point of agreement i s t h a t some consensus does exist at
the federal government levels of decisionmaking; but no mention of
cantonal behavior is ever made.

The limited available literature

caused some confusion in analysis because of a lack of a definitive
response to consociationality.

This framework was used in analyzing

the regression and correlation models of demonstrated budgetary
flexibility, interparty competition and direct democracy.
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The existence of direct democracy in the cantons of
Obwalden, Appenzell-ihr, and Appenzell-ahr necessitated the
formulation of a dummy variable.

These cantons conduct their

affairs through a town meeting type of decision process.

The

small size of the cantons, according to Mr. Alain Jacot of the Swiss
Embassy, is the main reason for this type of decisionmaking.

Again,

very little literature exists on the topic and most is reported
with investigations of party-based oppositions.
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Perhaps the scope

of my interpretation of direct democracy's impact is limited by this
lack of information, but not seriously so.
The final weakness exists in the insufficient number of
observations in the long-run analysis.

In order to apply large

group statistics, a minimum n of thirty is required.

The models

using the interparty competition variable have twenty-two
observations and the models with direct democracy have twentyfive.

This weakness has affected the statistical significance of

the interparty competition variable in one of the m o d e l s . W h i l e
twenty-five out of thirty is not seriously short of the n = 30
criteria, twenty-two out of thirty might be seen as troublesome.
Despite these weaknesses, the study presents statistically
reliable models to explain variation in DBF.
and explains these models.
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Chapter IV identifies

CHAPTER IV
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ACCOUNTING FOR CANTONAL
DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY

The Swiss study revealed three variables as useful in
explaining intercantonal differences in DBF.

These variables are:

environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy and interparty competition/
direct democracy.

Tables 5 and 6 present statistics indicative of

the great diversity apparent in the explanatory variables.
Regressions models employing these variables are found in
Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12.

These models account for much of the

intercantonal demonstrated budgetary flexibility and therefore
are useful in defining budget-setting environments in which incre
mental assumptions may not hold.
Of the three variables, environmental complexity offers the
strongest explanation of DBF.

As noted in Chapter III, the more

complex the environment, the more decisions must be made on altering
or setting budget priorities.

Therefore, in order to cut down or

simplify the environment, decisionmakers rely on several incremental
assumptions:
precedent.

1) allocation rules; 2) "satisficing"; and 3) historical
If this reasoning is correct, then environmental

complexity should be negatively correlated with DBF.
this idea.

Table 7 supports

Environmental complexity is negatively correlated (-.4875)
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TABLE 5
STATISTICS DESCRIBING THE SHORT-RUN EXPLANATORY
VARIABLES' VALUES FOR SWISS CANTONS

VARIABLE

N

MAXIMUM

MINIMUM

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

E nv. Comp.
(Nat. Log of Pop.)

275

9.51

4.86

7.28

1.13

Fiscal Autonomy
(Ratio of Fed.
contributions to
cantonal contributions)

275

6.49

06

.56

.90

Inter-Party Competition
(1507o-”7o Blog of 5
major pties)

242

50.00

13.33

38.28

10.04

Direct Democracy

275

1.00

.12

.32

(%)
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TABLE 6
STATISTICS DESCRIBING THE LONG-RUN EXPLANATORY
VARIABLES’ VALUES FOR SWISS CANTONS

VARIABLE

N

Env. Complexity
(Nat. Log of Pop.)

25

Fiscal Autonomy
(Ratio of Fed.
contributions to
cantonal contributions)

MAXIMUM

STANDARD
DEVIATION

MINIMUM

MEAN

9.33

4.90

7.28

1.15

25

2.80

.07

56

.63

Inter-Party Competition
(| 50% - Bloc %|)

22

50.00

15.65

38.28

9.75

Direct Democracy

25

1.00

.12

.33

(%)
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TABLE 7
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
N = 275

VARIABLES

DBF____________ 1.000

Env.
Comp .

-.4875
.0001

1.000

Fiscal
-.0693
Autonomy_______ .2746

-.3741
.0001

1.000

Interparty
-.0746
Competition_____ .2705

"-.1732
.3205
.0069____ .0001_______

Direct
Democracy

-.5701
.0684
0.000
.0001____ .2583______
1.000
Env.
Fiscal
Interparty
Comp.
Autonomy
Competition

.4313
.0001
DBF

c * > .05
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1.000

1.000
Direct
Democracy

with DBF.

Further, Table 7 reveals that no multicolinarity problem

exists with any of the variables which might affect conclusions drawn
from the data.
The second explanatory variable is fiscal autonomy.
Represented as the ratio between the level of federal contributions
to the level of cantonal contributions, this variable addresses the
influence of cantonal independence in determining budget priorities.
The less money a canton receives from the federal government, the
more autonomous it is.

The canton is able to allocate or reallocate

funds more easily because less monies are

precommitted.

Given this

logic and the method of calculating the variable, there should exist
a negative relationship between DBF and fiscal autonomy.

As the ratio

of federal funds to cantonal funds increases, DBF should decrease.
Table 7 supports this contention.

The more autonomous a canton,

the more flexible the budget-setting priorities (-.0693).
The most flexible canton over the 275 observations was
Appenzell-ihr.

This discovery should not be surprising because of

the strength of the two explanatory variables defined so far.
Appenzell-ihr is a small canton with a population of 13,000.

All

of its citizens are Catholic and Christian Democrats, making the
area homogeneous.

The canton roughly generates 31.74 p e r c e n t ^ of

its monies and has a maximum DBF of 19.00.

The flexibility is due

in part to its small size, verifying the hypothesis that the less
complex an environment is, the more flexible its budget.

Secondly,

the level of fiscal autonomy indicates that it is not overly dependent
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on the federal government for funds.

Therefore, it has the capability

of exercising its options to shift priorities because fewer funds
are precommitted.
The third variable accounting for variation in DBF is
interparty competition.

In the short-run analysis of interparty

competition, the voting "bloc" is composed of Social Democrats,
Christian Democrats, Radicals, Liberals and the Swiss People's
Party.

Table 7 shows that an inverse relationship exists between

DBF and competition.

Some conclusions can be drawn from this.

In

highly competitive situations, political parties are more sensitive
to marginal citizens1 needs.
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Studies assume that in order to win

votes, the parties will opt for budget changes in favor of voters'
preferences.

By definition then, governments that change spending

priorities demonstrate more DBF than do those that merely maintain
existing ones.

By looking at the correlations between DBF and

interparty competition, one sees that governments with a politically
competitive environment do not change budget priorities.

Although

the correlation is weak (-.0746), the relationship still exists.
Apparently, the closer one moves to a one-party bloc, the more
flexible the budget-setting priorities.

The same results were found

in the Japan and West German studies.
In the Japanese analysis, the more competitive situation-,__
yielded parties with a less stable majority.

Therefore, DBF tended

to be less because the lack of a stable majority prevented the forma
tion of consensus within the legislature to alter the budget.
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In

less competitive situations, one party holds a majority and thus
is capable of mustering the necessary votes to change resource
allocations.
The Swiss study supports this contention.

Chapter III

explains that the bloc acts as one large party with many factions,
mirroring the image of the LDP in Japan.

As the LDP dominated

Japanese politics, especially through the MOF, demonstrated budgetary
flexibility increased.

The same holds true for Switzerland.

The

bloc never maintains less than a 13 percent majority in cantonal
governments.

It always has a margin of control, allowing it the

liberty of altering budget priorities.

In those cantons with a

high interparty competition figure, DBF is high.

The higher the

interparty competition variable, the closer to a one-party system.
Certain American studies
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by V. 0. Key, Jr., Thomas Dye,

and Glen T. Broach support the reasoning that in more highly
competitive situations, political parties tend to be more responsive
to voters1 needs.

These studies assume that parties attain votes by

promising to alter present expenditure patterns in the voters' favor.
Governments that change spending priorities demonstrate more
budgetary flexibility than those which maintain existing ones.
The three variables run in the short-run regression are
shown in Table 9.

This model is the only one with four variables

in it because of the need to have a statistically reliable explana
tion for DBF's variation.

The fourth variable is local resource

availability, whose format measure was taken from the studies of
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West Germany and Japan.

In both of these, local resource avail

ability was the major explanation for DBF.

In the Swiss study, it

does not enter the explanation except for this model.

Local resource

availability was not used because of the multicolinarity problems
it has with interparty competition.
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The higher the correlation,

the more difficult it is to distinguish which variable is responsible
for what effect.

Therefore, it was not used.

Further, this model

explained 23.40 percent of the variation, the lowest of all models.
Table 9 confirms the explanatory capacity of each variable
and verifies that environmental complexity is the most powerful
explanation of DBF.

Complexity accounts for 41 percent of the

23.40 percent of the variation in DBF.

While this variable is the

most important for my study, the results are similar to those found
in West Germany and Japan.

Basically, the size of the unit of govern

ment and the complexity of the environment determine a good portion
of budget-setting priority policy.
A fourth political variable is analyzed in Switzerland:
democracy.

direct

Chapters II and III define the concept and where it

exists in Switzerland.

Table 10 indicates the regression results and

Tables 7 and 8 present the correlation outcomes between DBF and direct
democracy,

in theory, direct democracy is citizen input through the

institutions of the initiative and the referendum.

Any minority

group can gain recognition or input into public policy by instituting
one of these tools.

If it is true that governments respond to

citizen needs, which citizens determine and convey through the direct
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TABLE 8
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
N = 25

VARIABLES

DBF

1.000

Env.
-.8000
Comp ._________ (.0001)

1.000

Fiscal
.0986 -.5484
Autonomy______ (.6390) (.0045)____ 1.000

Interparty
Competition

Direct
Democracy

-.0291 -.1803
(.8977) (.4219)

.7109
(.0001)
DBF

-.5703
(.0029)
Env.
Comp.

.4617
(.0305)________ 1.000

.0998
(.6350)
Fiscal
Autonomy

° ^ = .05
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0.000
(1.000)
Interparty
Competition

1.000
Direct
Democracy

TABLE 9
SHORT-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE,
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY, LOCAL RESOURCE
AVAILABILITY AND INTERPARTY COMPETITION

N = 275

F Value = 16.416

VARIABLES

RSQR = .2340

B

BETA

STD. ERROR

PROB. T

Environmental
Complexity

-1.33

- .46

.19

.0001

Fiscal
Autonomy

-0.90

-.31

.19

.0001

Local Resource
Availability

-

0.01

-.19

.01

0102

Interparty
Competition*

-0.04

-.16

.02

.0306

*Only 242 O B S .
•C = .05
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TABLE 10
SHORT-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE,
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY

N = 275

F Value = 40.937

RSQR = .3330

VARIABLES ________________ B

BETA

STD. ERROR

PROB. T

Environmental
Complexity

-1.39

-.49

.19

.0001

Fiscal
Autonomy

-0.92

-.27

.19

.0001

1.64

.16

.63

.0103

Direct
Democracy

= .05
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democracy instruments, then one expects a positive relationship
between direct democracy and DBF.

As citizens change their minds,

the government changes its policies, producing more flexible
budgets.
Three cantons in Switzerland are run totally by direct
democracy:

Appenzell-ihr, Appenzell-ahr and Obwalden.

They range

in size from 13,000 to 240,000 inhabitants and each is politically
homogeneous.

Appenzell-ihr, as pointed out earlier, is the most

flexible canton with a maximum DBF of 19.00.
maximum DBF of 14.91 and Obwalden of' 14.54.

Appenzell-ahr has a
Of the three cantons,

Appenzell-ihr is the smallest (least complex) and, thus, the most
flexible; Obwalden is the largest and the least flexible of the three.
But the idea that direct democracy affects DBF positively is
supported in Tables 7 and 10.

There are no muiticolinarity problems

with the variable direct democracy and a correlation of .4314 (.0001)
indicates a strong relationship with DBF.

Apparently, if the type of

government is direct democracy, the demonstrated budgetary flexibility
increases.

Or, where direct democracy exists, DBF will be high.

Perhaps this indicates that voters do not feel as tied to resource
allocation rules or historical precedents as do voter representatives.
Rather, they determine budget priorities based on fluctuating social
needs.
The regressions in Table 10 verify direct democracy's impact
on DBF.

The short-run direct democracy model explains more of the

variation in DBF (RSQR = .3330) than does the interparty competition

46

model (RSQR = .2340) in Table 9.

A conclusion can be made that the

type of government influences the budget-setting priorities of a
canton.

In this instance, those cantons with representative demo

cracies have larger populations (more complex environment) and greater
dependence on the federal government for funds.

Therefore, the

logical expectation is that they would rely more heavily on incre
mental assumptions than the direct democracies.

Incremental

assumptions as a basis for budget-setting priorities are reflected
in DBF.

If the DBF is low, one expects incremental decisionmaking.

The Swiss study's regression models can bear out this conclusion.
Tables 9 and 10 show that high levels of DBF are associated
with low levels of environmental complexity or interparty competition
or fiscal autonomy or high levels of direct democracy.

In comparison,

it can be seen that Table 10 variables constitute a much more potent
explanation for variations in DBF than do Table 9 variables
vs.

.2340, respectively).

(RSQR = .3330)

If these relationships are accurate, then

the long-run analysis should reinforce my conclusions.
Tables 11 and 12 represent the two long-run studies of Swiss
DBF.

Long-run analyses are carried out to eliminate the effects of

unspecified variables.

The regression equations, as done, eliminate

the need to perform partial correlations; therefore the effects
noted in Tables 11 and 12 are accurate representations of those
variables’ impact on intercantonal DBF.
The long-run studies reinforce the theoretical relationships
of the explanatories to DBF.

Environmental complexity or difficulty
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TABLE 11
LONG-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE,
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY AND INTERPARTY
COMPETITION

N = 22
VARIABLES

F Value = 12.699

RSQR = .6791

B

BETA

STD. ERROR

PROB. T

Environmental
Complexity

-1.50

-1.03

24

.0001

Fiscal
Autonomy

-1.39

-0.63

.41

.0033

0.07

.02

.6241

Interparty
Competition

Oi =

0.011

.05
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TABLE 12
LONG-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE,
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY AND DIRECT
COMPETITION

N = 25

F Value = 37.583

RSQR = .8430

VARIABLES_________________ B____________BETA______ STD. ERROR

PROB. T

Environmental
Complexity

-1.15

-.88

.22

.0001

Fiscal
Autonomy

-1.28

-.42

.34

.0011

1.47

.24

.65

.0363

Direct
Democracy

CK

= .05
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of decision-making process, is expected to remain the most useful
explanatory variable of budget-setting priorities.

Fiscal autonomy

is also expected to remain significant and politics should be weakly
related to DBF.

The one problem--small number of cases--will

exacerbate the multicolinarity difficulties, but should not harm
the verification of the short-run results.
Neither model uses local resource availability because of
the multicolinarity problem between interparty competition and the
resource variable (-.63589).

It is difficult to discern whether

it's autonomy or wealth that is having an effect on DBF.

Some

wealthy cantons receive higher levels federal assistance than some
poorer ones.

Therefore resource availability was not used in the

models.
Table 11 represents a repeat of the short-run analysis of
the interparty competition model.

Although there are only twenty-

two cases for this model, it is useful in showing that the two most
powerful explanatory variables remain powerful.

The multicolinarity

problem and insufficient number of cases explain the lack of
statistical significance of interparty competition.
Table 12 portrays the relationship of environmental complexity,
fiscal autonomy and direct democracy to DBF.

It is the most useful

model, explaining 8 4 -percent (RSQR = .8430) of the variation in DBF.
Again, the number of cases is under the n required for large group
statistics, but the significance of the model is not affected.
For environmental complexity, assume that the complexity of
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the environment is determined by the number of demands which
determine the programs, departments and agencies' services to the
public.

The more programs needed, the more resources were to be

allocated or reallocated.

In Switzerland, this study was unable

to observe directly the complexity of the environment by counting
the number of civil servants or federal employees.

Because two

previous studies used population (in some form) as an indicator of
complexity, I assume that decisionmakers will behave as those did
in West Germany and Japan and therefore used population as the
measure of complexity.

I expect Swiss decisionmakers to rely on

standard operating procedures, i.e., incremental rules.
The long-run analysis indicates that environmental complexity
accounts for 60 percent of the variation in DBF.

Fiscal autonomy

explains 32 percent and direct democracy provides the justification
for the remaining variation.
of the total variation in DBF.

The entire model explains 84 percent
Important to note is that fiscal

autonomy alone has a weak relationship with DBF (see Table 8:
.09864), but when controlled for effects of other variables in the
regression model, it is consistently the second most important
explanation.
Table 14 is the final comparison between Japanese prefectures
and Swiss cantons.

The average DBF for Swiss cantons is 5.80,

accounting for 14 categories and the total budget.

Average Japanese

DBF for 6 categories and the Ordinary Account budget equals 2.79.
Table 14 is the adjusted DBF of Switzerland compared to Japan.
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TABLE 13
LONG- AND SHORT-RUN STATISTICS DESCRIBING
SWISS CANTONS' AVERAGE DEMONSTRATED
BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY

N = 25
MEAN

MAXIMUM

MINIMUM

Avg. DBF

5.80

10.85

3.54

Adjusted Avg.
DBF
(DBF x 6/14)

2.55

4.77

1.55

N = 275
MEAN

MAXIMUM

A v g . DBF

5.80

19.00

Adjusted Avg.
DBF
(DBF x 6/14)

2.55

8.36
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MINIMUM
1.08

.475

TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF AVG. DBF OF SWITZERLAND,
JAPAN AND WEST GERMANY

Avg. DBF
Switzerland
(N = 25 or 275)
(Adjusted)

2.55

Japan
(N = 46 or 460)

2.79

West Germany
(N = 105)

5.67
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The figures in this table indicate that perhaps the Swiss cantons
are not as flexible as thought to be.

Both Japanese prefectures

and Swiss cantons appear to be extraordinarily stable when compared
to West German municipalities.

West German cities do not labor

under some form of consensus-seeking decisionmaking procedure; this
may explain partially the flexibility of West Germany and the
inflexibility of Switzerland and Japan.
tionality mirrors Japan's baransu.

Switzerland's consocia-

The desire to avoid conflict and

budget stability seem to go hand in hand.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

This study defines the demonstrated budgetary flexibility of
Swiss cantons.
DBF of 5.80.

The cantons are relatively stable, with an average
Several characteristics exist to explain this situation.

Environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy, interparty competition
and direct democracy are the explanatory variables describing varia
tion in DBF.

Both short- and long-run regressions and correlations

support the contention that incremental assumptions are more
applicable in some cantons than in others.
The analysis of Swiss DBF confirms the results of earlier
studies, plus addresses the questions of consociationalism, direct
and representative democracy.

Through empirical evidence, this

analysis proved that Swiss budget priorities remain stable over time
and across units of government.

In comparison to the Japanese and

West German studies, Swiss cantons tend to be more stable than either
of these.

One explanation for this stability may be the consocia-

tional environment.

The Japanese concept of baransu is similar to

the Swiss concept of-consociationalism. Switzerland's political
environment functions under a consensus-oriented atmosphere.

Therefore,

consociationalism may be a contributing factor to DBF.
The desire to achieve consensus makes it logical for cantonal
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governments to rely on incremental assumptions:

"satisficing,"

simple allocation rules, and historical precedent.

Those cantons

with representative democracy may depend on these incremental
assumptions in order to pass a budget each year.

The stability of

the budget could be due to these incremental assumptions.
Several factors are capable of explaining the variation in
DBF.

Of the four variables tested, environmental complexity remained

the strongest predictor of demonstrated budgetary flexibility in
both the short- and long-run analyses.

The tables presented in

Chapter IV support this argument that cantons with higher levels of
environmental complexity tend to demonstrate lower levels of DBF
than do cantons with lowe

levels of environmental complexity.

Of the three remaining variables, fiscal autonomy was the
second most reliable predictor of DBF.

The less dependent a canton

was on the federal government for monies, the more flexible the
budget-shares.

Interparty competition, as presented in Chapters III

and IV, showed that political influence on budget-setting priorities
was present, but minimal.

Because of the consociational atmosphere,

political competition remains low.

Parties, as Harold Glass points

out,57 all have an opportunity to enter the political arena.
Therefore an overwhelming majority for any party is unlikely.
Further, the fact that a "bloc" of parties exists, acting as one
large party, makes it probable that interparty competition will
be practically nonexistent.

The empirical data supports this

statement.
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The models in Chapter IV indicate that competition accounts
for only about 6 percent of the variation in demonstrated budgetary
flexibility.
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Given this percentage, interparty competition is

not a powerful explanation of DBF; the studies in West Germany
did not indicate an overwhelming effect by competition.
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The

consociational political situation in Switzerland most probably
accounts for this result.
The fourth variable-direct democracy--was the third possible
explanation for DBF variation.

This variable was the second political

variable tested and it produced significant results.

In the long-

run, direct democracy explained 12 percent of the variation in DBF.
The three cantons with direct democracy demonstrated greater budget
flexibility than the representative democracies.

This could signify

that as the decisionmaking process is more decentralized, priorities
are fixed by nonincremental assumptions.

That is, citizens in

direct democracies decide budget priorities through program evalua
tion, rather than reliance on historical precedent or "satisficing.11
In Switzerland, perhaps, direct democracy removes the need for
incremental decisionmaking procedures.
In sum, certain settings make it highly likely that incremental
tools will be used in cantonal budget-setting.

High levels of

environmental complexity or dependence on federal funds or political
competition yield low levels of DBF--i.e.,

situations where incremental

assumptions would be used in determining the budget.

Zurich, Berne,

Lucerne, Geneva, and Uri are all cantons which fulfill one or more
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of the above criteria and thus have fairly stable budgets.

Uri,

for example, had the most inflexible budget-setting priorities of
all the cantons.

It had an average DBF of 3.32.
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The comparative analysis between Japan, West Germany, and
Switzerland yields some interesting results.

Swiss cantons are less

flexible (2.55) than Japanese prefectures (2.79).
aggregation, some departments were lumped together.

But because of
The smaller

number of Japanese departments means less flexibility and when the
Swiss budget categories are adjusted for comparison to the Japanese,
they are also less flexible.

In other words, the seven departments

with close to 50 percent of the budget, retain their 50 percent
share.

This is the fundamental assumption upon which incremental

theory is based--that departments will maintain their absolute
share of the budget pie.

This absolute inflexibility was not found

in any of the three studies.
Table 15 represents a comparative analysis of the three
studies’ explanatory variables.
seen clearly.

The power of each variable can be

Environmental complexity in the Swiss investigation

overwhelmingly explains the majority of the variation in DBF,
whereas local resource availability is the most powerful explanatory
in West Germany and Japan.
The questioning of incremental procedures opens the door to
further research.

Decisionmaking in Switzerland has been identified

as consensus-oriented.

Examination of the budget and further testing

of the theories expounded in Rickards’ West German study could aid in
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quantifying the concept of consociationality.

Most research and

literature on consociationalism has not been quantitatively supported.
Through empirical evidence of consensus in budget-making, proof
could be found for consociationalism1s existence in Switzerland.
The most useful research would be a thirty-plus year study
of Swiss DBF.

The present analysis is sufficient for testing the

hypotheses presented in the West German and Japanese analyses, but
the results could be verified

(statistically) better if the time

period were longer.
Finally, three policy recommendations for budgeting come to
mind when trying to avoid falling into an incremental "rut.11 First,
the simplification of the decision-making environment would reduce
budgetmakers' reliance on incremental tools.

In essence, the process

could be decentralized to the point where each unit must evaluate
programs and priorities as opposed to reallocating each programs' >
previous budget.

The unit of government itself, should handle the

analysis on a much more local level.

Perhaps giving the legisla

ture more time, money and staff to adequately analyze the budget
would provide a stepping stone toward a non-incremental direction.
Second, the evaluation of government programs should be done
every two to three years.

As long as programs exist for extended

periods of time without checks, the tendancy toward waste and
undemocratic allocation of finite resources exists.

To avoid

this inefficiency, priorities should be determined in a more nonincremental way.

There should be less reliance on "satisficing"
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and more on program merit.
Third, the political environment should be modified to
include a sufficient amount of competition.

Competition could be

encouraged by making more officeholders beholden to the public.
This competition could insure some checks and balances on the budgetmakers since the legislature must ultimately approve the budget.
If the legislators were more responsive to citizens' desires,
perhaps the executives would rely less on incremental processes
than they presently do.
In closing, the top explanatory variables defining variation
in DBF equal:

environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy, interparty

competition/direct democracy. : Although local resource availability
was a powerful explanatory variable in the other two studies, it was not
applicable here.

As noted in Chapter IV, there was insufficient

variation in the local resource availability variable to make it
usable in more than one model.

And even in that one model, it was

not a potent explanation.
The settings where incremental assumptions are most likely
to occur are:

when interparty competition is high or when fiscal

autonomy is high or when environmental complexity is high.

These

conclusions support the results of the West German and Japanese
analyses indicating that further case studies testing and retesting
of these assertions would prove helpful in justifying incremental
theory.

By applying his model to another culture and nation, my

findings have substantiated the empirical validity of the Rickards'
assumptions.
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budget priorities.
If the executive branch is responsible for
budget-setting, and the legislative branch merely approves, then
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In Japan, the MOF with input by
the LDP, determines budget priorities.
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is responsible at the local level for setting priorities.
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The correlation between the two variables equals -.63589.
This study used .6 as the highest acceptable level of multicolinarity.
"^The models were tried with local resource availability as
the fourth variable, but both proved to be statistically insignifi
cant.
The model with interparty competition already suffers from
an inadequate h = 22, making it difficult to apply large group
statistics as pointed out in Chapter III.
I expected multicolinarity
problems and got them. The final reason for not using local
resource availability is that the two most powerful variables—
environmental complexity and fiscal autonomy--hoId. They explain
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the explanatory capacity of interparty competition and local
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To reach the adjusted comparable figures Swiss DBF is
multiplied by 6/14, which represents the ratio of Japanese to Swiss
budget categories.
The new Swiss DBF equals 2.552.
■^Glass, introduction.
58

The short-run model has the variables environmental
complexity, fiscal autonomy, local resource availability and
interparty competition.
59

See R. C. Rickards’ dissertation:
"Non-Routine Decision
making: A Study of Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility in West German
Municipalities’ Budgetary Priority-Setting.11
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DBF of 3.32 equals 1.42 when adjusted for comparison with
Japan by the procedure outlined in footnote 56.
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